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The Special Operations Executive  
(SOE) in Austria, 1940-1945
Gerald Steinacher 
“Passive grumbling, rather than resistance” 1
In January 1941, Great Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) defined its 
policy on Austria with two objectives: (1) to assist in the disintegration of the Third 
Reich by fostering the soon to be expected all-out revolutionary and separatist up-
rising in Austria; and (2) to bring about the “restoration of Austria as a national 
unit” within the framework of a central European federation. In short, the hopes 
and aspirations of the SOE in the Austrian resistance against Nazi Germany were 
flying high.2 Five years later, in March 1946, Britain’s political representative in Vi-
enna, William B. Mack, summarized the history of the Austrian resistance for For-
eign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Already the first phrases of Mack’s report made clear 
that there was hardly any history to tell: “The Austrian Resistance Movement cannot 
bear comparison with similar organizations in other countries occupied by the Ger-
man Army during the war nor, with the possible exception of the Communist-spon-
sored Austrian Freedom Front (O.F.F.) and the all-party ‘O5’ Organization, did any 
section of it make any significant contribution to the Allied victory.”3 
Now, with the SOE files on Austria partially released, the history of the Austrian 
resistance can be written, at least from the British perspective, ranging from high ex-
pectations at the beginning to disillusion at the end. What were the SOE plans and 
actions on promoting Austrian resistance and what was finally achieved?4  
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Responding to the Nazi Invasion 
When German troops entered Austria on the morning of 12 March 1938 they 
found no resistance. In all major towns large crowds of Austrians welcomed the 
Wehrmacht as liberators. As a consequence, the country became an integral part of 
the Third Reich. With only Mexico protesting, the international powers accepted 
the development on the grounds of British “appeasement policy” with Adolf Hitler. 
Austria should cease to exist forever-or should it? 
Britain’s reaction to the vanishing of the Republic of Austria was not protest 
but secret action. With the feeling that there was more to come from Hitler, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill ordered a new section of the Secret Intelligence Ser-
vice (SIS)-Section D-which was to become the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE). Never really happy about the Anschluss, Churchill saw Austria as a war-
time tool that could be used to weaken Germany and reorder Central Europe. 
For Churchill, Austria was among the countries for whom Great Britain took the 
sword. His Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, made the unspecified British position 
clear in January 1942: The Anschluss was not formally repudiated, nor was Austria 
considered an occupied country.5 Emphasis was placed on the liberation of Aus-
tria from Nazi rule, not on an independent Austria.6 The SIS headquarters in Vi-
enna was soon neutralized when Station Chief Captain Thomas Kendrick was ar-
rested by the Gestapo in August 1938. George Berry, the new Station Chief, had 
insufficient time before the outbreak of the war to organize an efficient network of 
agents to remain in occupied Austria.7 
The plan for Austria did not restart before January 1941, when the SOE defined 
its policy on Austria with two objectives. The first was to assist in the disintegra-
tion of the Third Reich by fostering the soon-to-be-expected revolutionary and 
separatist uprising in Austria, fully supported by propagandist, political, and mil-
itary action. The principal organizations to be contacted for this aim were the So-
cial Democrats, the Catholics, and the Monarchists. To prepare ground for the im-
minent uprising against the Germans, the Social Democrats and Catholics would 
be contacted and supported via the SOE’s ample channels in Yugoslavia, and the 
Monarchists through Hungary. A special elite corps of saboteurs, paratroopers, 
and leaders would be sent into the country “twenty-four hours before the crack 
comes.” Single acts of sabotage or partisan movements were strictly condemned.8 
This concept of “secret armies” was formulated in 1940-1941 by SOE director Major 
Colin Gubbins for all European countries; Austria was to be no exception.9 Brit-
ain’s high expectations were partly based on the fact that the SOE planners on 
Austria saw the Anschluss as a result of the efficiency of the German military and 
political apparatus. For this reason, according to the SOE, there was no possibility 
of resistance or bloodshed. A fait accompli was achieved within a matter of hours.  
The Special Operations Executive in Austria 1940–1945     213
The second, obviously less important aim was “the restoration of Austria as a na-
tional unit.” Austria would be divided into provinces. Exiled Austrians would be se-
lected for key positions within the country for “the decisive moment.” But the SOE 
plan contained no details on Austrian borders or political systems. 10 In fact, the SOE 
took over from Britain’s vague foreign policy. All groups of Austrian resistance, from 
the extreme right to the extreme left, would be contacted and supported for anti-
German action. Therefore, getting in touch with Austrian politicians, both those in 
exile and those still in Austria, was deemed most important. 11 Consequently, the 
SOE contacted Austrian organizations in London. In 1941- 1942, these consisted a 
wide range of small and smaller organizations, such as the Communist-sponsored 
Free Austria Movement, the Association of Austrian Social Democrats, Austria Of-
fice, Austrian Academy, and the Austrian Centre, among others.12 A bitterly divided 
group, no single organization could be representative of overall opinion in Austria. 
The Foreign Office therefore advised the SOE to “limit such informal contacts as 
prove essential to the bare minimum.” The SOE could not discuss any questions of 
foreign policy, and there could be no encouraging of a central Austrian representa-
tion of any kind in Great Britain. 13 
The Austrian Psyche 
In January 1943, Britain’s Foreign Office summed up the “Opinion and Morale in 
Austria,” outlining chances of resistance based on SOE sources. Austria remained 
a separate country, despite the similarity between Austria and southern Germany. 
This could not be changed by the Anschluss. On the contrary, the feeling of “Aus-
trians being different from Germans” grew even stronger. The “boom” immediately 
after the Anschluss vanished rapidly, and in 1941 doubt grew as to whether the An-
schluss was justified at the price of war. 
The following factors contributed to bring about this change of mind: Austri-
ans thought that the war was primarily the Germans’. The news of casualties had a 
bad effect on morale. Dislike of German and Prussian prapotence in the land, and 
the large numbers of refugees from the Reich, disappointed Austrian Nazis, who 
achieved far lower positions than they had hoped for. Goebbels’s propaganda against 
the Russian Asiatic hordes showed effect in Austria as in Germany. The strong re-
ligious sentiments of the peasantry were affronted by anti-Catholic measures. The 
Austrians longed for nothing so much as the end of the war. In addition, there was 
less fear of the consequences of defeat in Austria than there was in Germany, but 
also no agreement as to what the future of Austria should be. The Anschluss wish 
was dead, but an open dislike of the Nazi regime provided very little evidence that 
Austrians anywhere were prepared to make violent uprisings for the sake of their 
freedom. 14 This would be changed by encouraging Austrian patriots. 
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But how could this be achieved? At this stage, the most important SOE infor-
mant on Austria was Sir George Franckenstein, the former Austrian ambassador to 
Britain. Franckenstein contributed his views and suggestions to the making of gen-
eral British policy on Austria: Great Britain should take the initiative with regard to 
the Austrian question, he said, otherwise “Austria could land in the Russian net.” 15 
He pleaded for a declaration from the Allies concerning Austria’s liberation and in-
dependence. This, he stated, was the only way to develop Austrian resistance and to 
contribute to the Allied war efforts. Due to their key positions, he urged that Austri-
ans should have been central in encouraging and leading sabotage, revolts, and re-
moval of Austrian units in the Wehrmacht. 16 
The Road To Independence 
The turning point in Allied foreign policy on Austria came on 1 November 1943, 
when the Allies affirmed in the Moscow Declaration that Austria, as the first vic-
tim of Hitler’s aggression, should regain its independence after the war ended. But 
in reminding Austria of its own responsibility in the war, the Allies stated that they 
would take into account what the Austrians would themselves do for their liber-
ation. Now that clear policy on Austria’s future had been formulated for the first 
time,17 this declaration was intended to stir up Austrian resistance against Hitler. 
Not until after the Moscow Declaration did Allied post-war planning on Austria be-
gin on a broader scale. Massive BBC radio propaganda for the country did not actu-
ally begin until November 1943 in reaction to this declaration. 18
Because the SOE was still “comparatively ignorant of conditions inside Austria” at 
that time, it decided to do everything to increase secret intelligence from the coun-
try, however difficult it might be. 19 Without doubt, this document really backed 
Austrian patriots at a time when many considered the Anschluss as sealed by the 
Allies. Yet, to a good extent, members of the Austrian Resistance Movement could 
not achieve active military resistance to the Germans. Theirs could be better defined 
as passive resistance: the wearing of Austrian national colors and the use of the fa-
miliar and typical Austrian greeting “Grüß Gott” (God be with you) instead of “Heil 
Hitler.” As a Foreign Office official put it, this constituted “passive grumbling rather 
than resistance.” 20 
SOE’s Learning Process 
At the SOE’s London headquarters, Austrian affairs were dealt with in the Ger-
man division, directed by Ronald Thornley. Like Thornley himself, most of the 
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personnel were trained for Germany, not for Austria. Peter Wilkinson, who was 
given the German and Austrian Division to supervise, wrote: “I found this embar-
rassing, for I knew very little about Germany and nothing whatever about Austria, 
which I had only once visited as a tourist.” 21 Lacking most of the SOE files on Aus-
tria may have been a principal reason for the relative ignorance of the Austrian sit-
uation. By the end of 1943, there were two main centers for SOE activities on Aus-
tria: the small Central European Division in Monopoli in southern Italy (where the 
“Clowder missions” directed by Wilkinson are best known), and the Austro-Ger-
man Division in the SOE’s Bern outpost in neutral Switzerland, directed by H. I. 
“Bill” Matthey. “Clowder” began in late July 1944. One early report on these activ-
ities stated: “It is just pure bad luck, and our star will doubtless change soon, but 
there is no denying the fact that, after five months of toil, we still have no agents 
inside Austria.” 22 
“Clowder” saw only the southern parts of the Austrian province of Carinthia 
as a realistic base for penetrating Austria. The Slovenian-speaking population 
living mainly along the Austrian-Slovenian border had already been organized 
by Josip Broz (Tito) into a few partisan bands. From there, the plan was to pen-
etrate the Austrian heartland.23 But the beginning of 1945 brought total disillu-
sionment. “Clowder” did not consider that the Allies would be able to make “any 
declaration sufficiently attractive to the Austrians to persuade them to embark 
on a policy of open resistance, or to help us to any significant extent.” A wide-
spread resistance movement was not to be expected before the total defeat of 
Germany. 
The SOE position was later taken over by the director of the Foreign Office’s 
Central European department. Declarations and propaganda were not expected 
to encourage Austrian resistance to any larger degree: “All that can be hoped for 
is a small degree of sabotage and possibly one or two coups-de-main.” 24 This as-
sumption on Austrian resistance finally proved to be correct. The SOE missions 
sent to Carinthia soon realized that the Austrian Slovenians in southern Carin-
thia (partially organized as the “Austrian Freedom Front” or OFF) had little or 
no interest in liberating Austria, but more in occupying the territory claimed by 
Yugoslavia.25 
The activity of SOE parties in southern Carinthia, consisting partially of German-
speaking Austrians, was soon to be made impossible. In southern Austria, the Slo-
venian partisan movement was weak due to German raids. By the end of 1944, it 
had no organized connections to the resistance in central Austria. The SOE thus 
concluded that the penetration of Austria should become independent of the Tito-
sponsored partisan movement in the outermost areas of southern Austria. 26 Al-
though “Clowder” sent in a good number of SOE missions to Carinthia, it never 
achieved this goa1.27 Foreign Secretary Bevin was informed that “they were almost 
entirely composed of Austrian Slovenes, and until the last few days of the war … they 
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never fired a shot on Austrian soil.” 28 Peter Wilkinson gave two reasons for the fail-
ure of “Clowder”: first, there was no strong will for resistance up to the very last days 
of the war in Austria; and second, the SOE had underestimated both the seriousness 
and the consequences of Tito’s territorial claims in Austria. 29 
The Resistance Movement
The director of the German-Austrian Division of the SOE in Bern, Switzerland, 
was Squadron Leader H. I. Matthey. As he took over office in September 1944, he 
was introduced to the leader of “Patria,” the Austrian Monarchist resistance move-
ment, which was based in Switzerland. Matthey was convinced that if there was any 
chance of Catholic resistance, the “Patria” organization would develop it. As a con-
sequence, Matthey became more concerned with Austria than with Germany. 
Patria enabled the SOE to send its first missions into western Austria. The help-
ing hand of the discrete Swiss secret service was vital for these missions. The first re-
ports showed how difficult the work was, as well as how apathetic the Austrian pop-
ulation was. Missions to the Austrian population in the Italian border province of 
Bolzano (South Tyrol) showed more promise. In January, the Bern SOE office, with 
the help of Patria, contacted a resistance group under the leadership of Hans Egarter 
(his alias was “Barbarossa”) comprising as many as 600 men scattered in the valleys 
of the province. Everything possible was done to stimulate its activities. An Allied 
WIT operator, weapons, and money were sent in. The group had its headquarters 
in a liberated valley, executed some acts of sabotage, infiltrated German police reg-
iments, and defended themselves against German mop-ups. Its activity was stim-
ulated by one political aim: The annexation of the province to a new Republic of 
Austria. “Barbarossa” met John McCaffery once in Bern to discuss these territorial 
claims. In this way, they tried to influence Britain’s post-war territorial settlements 
in Europe.30 “Barbarossa’s” motivation for active resistance against the Germans was 
to show the Allies that their cause was also the cause of the Austrian minority in It-
aly. The “Patria” and “Barbarossa” organizations in the province of Bolzano were the 
only productive contacts Matthey ever handled. 31 In August 1945, he made this fact 
clear when he wrote:
It must always be matter for regret that [the Patria] did not get in touch with us 
a year or more earlier, since there is no doubt that, given a little more time, we 
might easily have got Barbarossa’s lot properly organized and from his group we 
might have slowly built up a network of smaller efficient groups in Austria. But 
the gods willed it otherwise, so we must content ourselves with the knowledge 
that there was at least one Austrian who got within measurable distance of effec-
tively resisting the Nazis. 32 
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Comparing The Movements
The parallels between the assumptions of “Clowder” and the SOE in Bern are ob-
vious. Both found resistance only in connection with territorial conflicts. The Siove-
nian partisan groups in southern Austria fought for the annexation of their area to 
Yugoslavia, while the Austrian resistance groups in the Italian province of Bolzano 
were motivated by the possible return of their homeland to Austria. Neither plan 
could be realized. They showed, however, the importance of territorial aims in Cen-
tral Europe in motivating resistance, and how they were underestimated or misun-
derstood by the SOE.
 The resistance group in the heartland of Austria best known to the United States 
and its wartime secret service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was “O5.” 
Though nonpartisan, it was dominated by the middle classes. With headquarters in 
Vienna, O5 claimed supporters throughout the country, but apart from the group in 
Innsbruck, it did not amount to much. In March 1945, the SOE reported for the first 
time on the group O5, based on OSS reports. The SOE took a very pessimistic view 
of the O5’s claims to organize widespread resistance in Austria. As the SOE realized, 
the OSS seemed miles ahead in establishing connections with O5, so the SOE de-
cided to align with the OSS and stated that it “should pull up our socks.” 33 The first 
SOE reports about O5 in April were still quite sceptical, because O5’s claims con-
tained “a great deal of wishful thinking.” 34 O5’s plans to assist in the liberation of Vi-
enna could not be realized because leaders of the Viennese resistance group were 
caught and executed by the German SS. The Foreign Office-SOE Committee stated 
in consequence “that there was very little evidence to show that the Viennese had 
assisted their liberation in any way.” 35 Only Innsbruck was liberated by O5 groups 
under the leadership of the late Foreign Minister Karl Gruber. The British politi-
cal representative in Vienna later informed Foreign Secretary Bevin about Gruber’s 
resistance: 
In Western Austria the main group ... seems to have been vaguely subordinated 
to O5 ... Its claim to have occupied Innsbruck before the arrival of American 
troops is to some extent vitiated by the fact that the German Army Group South-
West, which included the Tyrol in its command, had already signed the Armi-
stice at the time. This did, however, have the result that Dr. Gruber, the leader of 
the Resistance in the Tyrol and the present Foreign Minister, was able to form a 
provisional government in that province, where the Resistance Movement con-
tinued to maintain a considerable influence on political affairs up to the time of 
its official dissolution in December 1945. With the single exception of Tyrol, the 
Resistance Movement had exercised almost as little political influence since the 
end of hostilities as it did military influence before it. 36  
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Unanswered Questions 
Austrian Resistance was almost entirely passive: no open armed resistance, no 
partisan movement, and no leader of note produced (with the exception of Gruber). 
The attempt to stir up resistance by declarations promising independence and better 
treatment in exchange for resistance against the Third Reich proved to be a failure.
In recognizing this fact, three questions present themselves for further research:
1. On which assumptions were SOE plans up to 1943, expecting widespread 
open resistance in Austria, based? 
2. What were the differences between SOE plans for Austria and Germany? 
3. Why did the SOE miscalculate the importance of territorial and ethnic con-
flicts in Central Europe? These misinterpretations finally led to the failure 
of the main SOE centers of Austrian resistance: “Clowder” and the SOE of-
fice in Bern. 
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